Fatalism the game

Swinburne , Mellor and On yet other accounts the impossibility is simply a fundamental metaphysical fact which is not open to further analysis or explanation.

It is, of course, possible that the fatalist challenge about the difference between the future and the present and past cannot be successfully met. For instance, it could be argued a that the only successful answer would be one which appealed to a fundamental ontological distinction between the future and the present and past, but that b there is in fact no such distinction.

Shanks ; discussed in Oaklander But, as we have noted, even if this challenge cannot be met, it does not show that the fatalist is correct. The possibility remains that we can, in principle, affect the past. A problem which has been much discussed by philosophers, at least since the time of Augustine — , is whether divine omniscience is compatible with free will, and in particular with our having the power to do other than we do.

Let us suppose that being omniscient involves being infallible, and believing that p if and only if it is true that p. And each of these alternatives is impossible. Naturally it would be possible to object to some of the suppositions about the existence and nature of God. I will return to them. This seems plausible. One might, though, prefer to avoid all mention of bringing about, and to rephrase the argument in terms of counterfactuals.

So if God is omniscient in the way assumed, he would not hold this belief. The crucial point was that, even if someone lacked the power to do something inconsistent with a hard fact about the past, one might have the power to do something inconsistent with a soft fact about the past.

The difficulty for this strategy, though, is to give an account of soft facts about the past, or at least a species of soft facts about the past, which meets two conditions: 1 it makes it true that in one of the cases what Jones would be bringing about would be inconsistent with a soft fact of the right sort, and also 2 it is such that it is plausible at any rate in advance of any fatalist proofs to the contrary that in the case of soft facts of that sort it is in principle possible at a later date to bring things about which are inconsistent with them.

The Introduction to Fischer , and many of the articles in it are relevant to these issues. It is easy enough to give an account of soft facts which fails, apparently, to meet the second condition. For instance we might say that a proposition expresses a soft fact about a time if it entails a proposition about another time.

To say that the proposition about God entails that Jones will mow the lawn is to state the problem. It can hardly in itself constitute the solution. If it did we could solve the argument for fatalism which is based on causal determinism simply by pointing out that, if determinism is true, the fact that Jones will mow the lawn is entailed by a proposition about initial conditions and laws of nature, so that the latter is merely a soft fact.

It is also, as we have seen in connexion with logical fatalism, easy enough to delineate a species of soft facts about the past which do meet the second condition. But it is difficult to see how this species of soft facts could fulfil the first condition.

But to take that approach is, in effect, to abandon the idea of an Ockhamist solution, and to move on to the next solution. According to this solution, in some cases people have the power do things which are inconsistent with the actual facts about the past, even though they are hard facts. That is to say, in some cases people have the power to affect the past. In particular the suggestion is that Jones had the power to do something which would have brought it about that God did not believe in that he would mow the lawn.

Anglin The plausibility of such a solution will depend largely on the strength of the arguments for the impossibility of affecting the past. Now some such arguments seek merely to demonstrate this impossibility without offering any further explanation for it.

And it may be contended that most of the arguments of this sort which are at all compelling involve appealing to the obvious impossibility that an event might prevent its own occurrence, and to the slightly less obvious impossibility that an event might bring about its own occurrence.

But, in reply to such arguments, it may be claimed that these impossibilities are not sufficient to rule out the possibility that one event might bring about an earlier event, as long as the world is so organised as to avoid these impossible outcomes. If so, it is not clear why God should not have so organised it. And in particular it is not clear why God should not have so organised things that it is possible for us to do things which affect what beliefs he holds.

However, as we have seen, other arguments for the impossibility of affecting the past go further, and incorporate an explanation for the impossibility.

A successful defence against theological fatalism which appealed to the possibility of affecting the past would have to deal with these further issues. Boethius c— offered a solution to the problem which in effect denied the supposition that God existed in or believed anything in Thomas Aquinas —74 also offered this solution.

There may be a number of problems about whether a personal God could be timeless, and how, if at all, he could relate to a temporal world, but it is worth noting one particular problem.

The problem is that, although this solution does not appeal to the possibility of affecting the past, it may be vulnerable to some of the considerations which would tell against that possibility. For suppose that we are unable to affect the past, and that the explanation for this inability is that, whereas the future is not real, not actual, the past and present are real and actual. Then it might seem that the idea that we could bring about a timeless belief would have to be dismissed; the very fact that a belief was brought about would make it later than whatever brought it about, and so not timeless.

Though there would be some logical space, perhaps, for a view that, whereas it was true of temporal events that, if they were brought about, they must be later than what brought them about, this was not true of events in general. Of course, such considerations need not be fatal to the Boethian solution, because the view that the future is unreal, and the view that the temporal order is determined by the causal order are both controversial. What it does seem to mean, though, is that there is less room than one might have supposed for the success of the solution if it is impossible to affect the past.

Rice It is worth noticing a further potential awkwardness for the Boethian solution. But this may be questioned. Alston Instead his knowledge, in particular of our actions, may be thought as Russellian acquaintance knowledge; that is, as consisting of a simple cognitive relation between the knower and what is known. Russell , Chapter 5 The idea would be that, although in humans acquaintance knowledge gives rise to beliefs, God has just the cognitive relation to what he knows, without any consequent beliefs.

This seems to have been the way Boethius and Aquinas thought of it. And, given that this awareness is supposed to be a simple relation, there is no question of producing an analysis of the proposition which represents it as a conjunction of propositions each of which seem to express facts which do not depend on anything Jones can do. But this would not compromise his omniscience, since, presumably, on this account of knowledge, omniscience would be a matter of knowing all the facts.

For that matter, the account could also be combined with both the view that God is outside time and the view that the future is unreal — as long as these two views themselves are indeed compatible. Of course, a timeless being cannot change, but this would not involve a change in God, but merely a change in what he is related to. The number 10 does not change when I refer to it. But it could also be averted by denying that God needs to be thought of as omniscient — at any rate if omniscience involves infallible knowledge of all facts.

So, if it is logically impossible for someone to have infallible knowledge that Jones will mow the lawn and for Jones to have the power to refrain, it is no imperfection in God if he lacks such knowledge. Swinburne , —8. It could also be argued that there is no need to attribute infallible knowledge to God at all. Lucas and b. Some philosophers, notably Luis de Molina — and Alvin Plantinga, have held that God knows not only what actual people will freely do in the future, but what each possible free creature would have freely done in each set of possible circumstances, if fully specific; and that he had this knowledge at the creation.

An action is free in the required sense if not causally determined and not predetermined by God. In fact it seems that it is more threatening. Of course, one way of avoiding the threat would be to deny that there are in general any facts about what people would have freely done in circumstances that have not actually arisen; there may be facts about what they might have done, or what they would very probably have done; but not what they would have done.

It may help us to see this if we consider the tossing of a coin. Let us suppose that a coin is tossed on some occasion, and it comes down heads; and suppose we then ask if it would have come down heads again if we had tossed it again in exactly the same circumstances. It seems plausible, if we think that how it landed was undetermined, that the right answer is that it might have come down heads and it might have come down tails, but that it is not the case that it would have come down heads, nor the case that it would have come down tails.

So one solution to the fatalistic threat posed by middle knowledge is akin to the Aristotelian solution. Since there are no facts of the relevant sort, God cannot have knowledge of them. It is difficult to see how there could be. In the case of actual actions, the solutions depended on suggesting ways in which it might have been possible for Jones to do something which would bring it about that some fact about God was different; that is to say that they depended on showing how some fact about God might be dependent on what Jones did.

It seems that they could not be, because the facts that make them true were available to God at the creation, before he had decided to create anything, let alone Jones. Hasker , 39—52; see Hasker et al. It went like this:. If it is fated that you will recover from this illness, then, regardless of whether you consult a doctor or you do not consult a doctor you will recover. But also, if it is fated that you will not recover from this illness, then, regardless of whether you consult a doctor or you do not consult a doctor you will not recover.

But either it is fated that you will recover from this illness or it is fated that you will not recover. The thought, presumably, is that it is futile, because what you do will have no effect. If so, the reply given by Chrysippus cc B. Bobzien , 5. Bobzien , This is not to say that fatalism does not pose any problem at all for the rationality of deliberation. It is just to say that the Idle Argument does not show that it poses a problem.

There are a number of arguments for fatalism, and it seems that one way of countering all of them would be to adopt the Aristotelian solution, or something akin to it. It would be neat if it could be made out that this was the only solution, so that the fate of fatalism was inextricably linked to the fate of the Aristotelian solution.

But it does not seem that this is so, except possibly, on the assumption that an omniscient God exists, in relation to middle knowledge. But even then, the solution is only a poor relation to the Aristotelian solution. So it is possible that both fatalism and the Aristotelian solution are wrong. And it is, of course, always possible, for all that has been said, that fatalism is correct.

Logical fatalism: Diodorus Cronus and the necessity of the past 2. The necessity of the past and Aristotelian solutions 5. Theological Fatalism: Molina, Plantinga and middle knowledge 7. The Idle Argument 8. What he says could be presented as an argument along the following lines. Then p is true or not -p is true. Then either what the first person says is true or what the second person says is true. But the argument can evidently be generalised.

So, everything that happens, happens of necessity. So, is there anything wrong with the argument? So we may represent the Aristotelian solution as one which rejects the law of bivalence: The law of bivalence: every proposition is either true or false. For example, we may avoid hitting the pedestrian by noticing him stepping into the street, or we may not avoid the pedestrian because we were texting.

Whichever occurs would have been inevitable, even though we may also say that the accident was avoidable had we not been texting. One concept exists within the context of the other.

We could have started there if you liked. Do you agree that, if someone avoids doing what is legal and commits a crime , that such avoidance was since the big bang unavoidable? So back to the question above. In the context of deterministic inevitability the act was causally unavoidable from any point prior to the act going back through eternity. For example, it was deterministically inevitable 1 minute prior, 1 Big Bang prior, and 1 eternity prior. It also makes the notion of being more or less deserving than another irrational, which leads to greater equality a more egalitarian society if everyone understood it.

But we havent gotten to this point yet, we are jumping the gun here. Or, the idea of inevitability could allow someone an excuse for their own lack of compassion. If it justifies one, then it equally justifies the other. Causal inevitability is a constant on both sides of every equation.

It literally makes deterministically causes no difference. Or, the idea of inevitability can be used to shortcut the judgment of what someone deserves. For example, if it was inevitable that you killed someone, then it also is inevitable that you should be killed.

It works quite nicely into the idea of retributive justice. After all, if those are the rules then the result of breaking the rules is inevitable. You seem to think that the concept of inevitability is something new, and that you can assign it whatever meaning you wish. And, since it was inevitable, there was nothing anyone could do about it.

Some people are just lucky I guess. And the lucky deserve what they get due to their luckiness. And the unlucky deserve what they get due to their unluckiness. After all, such was their fate since the Big Bang! So we just should let things be as they are. If things were meant to be different, then they would be different. You, however, are just making up non-sense.

This is why we need to keep going from the very pedantic basics rather than jump way ahead like you are here. For example, I like how you answered my question: in quotes as some mixed up fatalist not even a fatalist would say what you said and not yourself. So I question if that is truly your answer, or if you are being sarcastic. Some people even conclude that if everything is inevitable we no longer have the freedom to choose anything for ourselves.

Silly, I know, but some people draw such irrational conclusions from deterministic inevitability. Even supposedly great physicists like Einstein and philosophers like Spinoza have gone down that rabbit hole.

I kinda wish they were here too, so I could explain it to them. And I just checked Wiki, the Roman goddess Fortuna also controlled your fate. Either gods or abstract concepts like luck or fate controlled your destiny. I was demonstrating how fatalism arises in some minds from the idea of deterministic inevitability.

Attempting to draw meaningful implication from inevitability leads to mental errors. Fatalism is one of those mental errors. My question: Everyone is familiar with the fact that we are shaped in part by genetics and in part by our environment and culture. Since the idea of external influences is already well established, what do you expect to change by insisting upon inevitability rather than simple cause and effect? They have no choice in the matter of what happens. They can let things be, or not let thing be, and per fatalism what they were destined will come to be.

In fact just the opposite. No one is more deserving of winning the lottery than another, just because they happen to win. If you need to, go back to the rules of this discourse. I want to avoid semantic games. So I will ask you the question once again, and please answer without using something tantamount to a religious parable. Do you agree that, if a person becomes a billionaire avoids poverty and obtains great wealth , and if another person is unable to gain any real wealth and remains poor avoids wealth gain , that such avoidance and obtainment , even before either person was even born, was unavoidable?

We can simply address what cause and effect means for our decisions. I need to stop us at this point. Once again we have gone off on tangents and away from the Socratic method. Can you keep within the constraints of this procedure? Here are the rules again if needed:. You may pick any event you like, and the answer is the same. However, it also remains also true that, for any event in which an autonomous person is the final responsible cause, that event is within the control of that person, such as he is at that time.

The problem is the harm done by the shooting and how to deterministically prevent future harms by the same causes. He can be restrained either in prison or a secure mental facility against his will in order to prevent further shootings. Next, we have the diagnosis of a brain tumor. If the brain tumor compromises his judgment, then the corrective operation may also take place against his will. Finally, after the tumor is removed, it may be that additional corrective actions are required, because it may turn out that other people with a similar tumor did not go on a shooting spree.

So, back to your question. And, assuming Whitman was a good and ethical person prior to the growth of the tumor, then the tumor is the most relevant cause of the shooting. However, it is the same bad acts, whether sane or not, that justify corrective actions to protect society. It is just the mode of correction that differs prison or mental facility. You are getting way ahead of yourself again, this question is not addressing how the person should be treated after the event at all, it asks specifically about the event itself.

I need to, once again, bring you back on track. Leaping ahead is not productive — remember — we need to move slowly here. Whitman, as he was at the time, was in control of the shooting. His brain tumor was part of who he was. His feelings of compulsion were also part of who he was. Even his insanity was part of who he was at the time of the shooting.

His own hands loaded the gun and pulled the trigger. In the absence of Whitman, the shootings would never have occurred. The final cause of the deaths was obviously Whitman pulling the trigger. Yes or No no further elaboration needed. So perhaps this should be my next question:. Imagine a guy with a brain tumor that pushed on his brain in a way that compelled him to not do what the gunman the man pointing the gun to his head demanded.

Well, context is everything. For example, suppose we have two scenarios. A In one scenario the guy with the gun to your head hijacks you and your car, requiring you to assist his escape.

B In the other scenario, the guy with the gun to your head puts a gun in your hand and tells you to blow the brains out of a third person. It may be reasonable to allow him to force you to assist in his escape but not reasonable for you to kill an innocent person to save your own life. So, what part of the brain is programmed to carry out a mass shooting when pressed?

I imagine it would be like hunger, where you sense the need to eat something, but the rest of the mind has to concoct the specific plan to make a sandwich. Both the gunman and the victim are physically in control of their own actions. However the threat of being shot coerces the victim to act against his will. It depends on how the presumptions of your question line up with the presumptions of my answer.

I hope my answer clarifies my presumptions for you. A Deciding to do what the gunman says in order to not be shot. B Deciding not to do what the gunman says with the chance of being shot. Context: Pragmatism is about what is useful or helpful to reach a goal or objective. The goal of morality is to achieve the best good and least harm for everyone. Perhaps you should send me the script so I know what my part is. YES or NO?

And that is because Plato wrote the script for both sides of the dialogue. We can never assume that any individual is going to come up with the best answer. If a misinterpretation should arise, it can be pointed to at that time in which case we can analyze if it truly was a misinterpretation or if a detraction of something is required on either end.

Also, if there are any questions that later on you want to detract and go the other way with because of an initial language confusion or any other reason — please do say so. Per your assessment:.

It preaches that we have no control, that all of our choices are already made for us, and that our will is only a rider on the bus being driven by inevitability. Fatalism encourages apathy, destroys morale, discourages autonomy, and undermines moral responsibility. Fatalism is morally corrupting. This part is correct. For determinism, it happens due to such. Examples of fatalism in a Sentence Many people seem to have developed a sense of fatalism about the war.

Recent Examples on the Web The sense of fatalism , a noir staple, is pervasive. First Known Use of fatalism , in the meaning defined above.

Learn More About fatalism. Time Traveler for fatalism The first known use of fatalism was in See more words from the same year. Style: MLA. English Language Learners Definition of fatalism. Get Word of the Day daily email! Test Your Vocabulary. Test your visual vocabulary with our question challenge!

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